

SP2023 Week 05 • 2023-02-23

Reverse Engineering III

Richard



Announcements

- Cyber Tractor Challenge (application due 2023-03-13)
 - Travel to Des Moines to learn how to secure John Deere equipment
- ICSSP Informational Meeting (2023-03-02)
 - Scholarship and government internship opportunity
 - 5pm @ Siebel CS 2405
- Come to SAIL!
 - If you want to present, [apply here](#) by midnight on the 24th (tomorrow!)
 - Free shirt and food for presenters, teach with up to 5 people on April 8th!



ctf.sigpwny.com

sigpwny{vm_stands_for_very_mad}



Topics

- **Virtual Machine (VM) reversing**
 - Common VM architectures
 - Control flow graphs
 - Tips and tricks
- **Instrumentation**
 - Side channel attacks
- **Memoization**



Virtual Machines

It's VMs all the way down...




What is a VM?

- Virtual machine: emulating a computer
 - **Instructions** that get interpreted to do certain commands
 - **I/O** to interact with the host computer
- Why?
 - To run one architecture on another (qemu)
 - To separate resources for security (KVM)
 - **To obfuscate code** (many CTF challenges)



Stack based VM

- separate instructions and data
- operations manipulate stack





PUSH 13
PUSH 45
PUSH 7
PUSH 20
→ ADD



Register based VM

- use registers to store intermediate data
- similar to common ISAs (x86, ARM, MIPS)
- usually have a dedicated space for data



```
MOV R1, 5  
MOV R2, 30  
MOV R3, 40  
MOV R4, 50  
➡ ADD R3, R1, R2
```




Reverse engineering VMs

- Write your own tooling!
 - control flow graphs
 - disassembler
 - debugger
- Tooling helpful for larger VMs



Control flow graphs

- shows how program behaves at a high level
- each node represents a **basic block** (one entry and one exit)
- two edges from a node could be an if statement
- an edge going "back" could be part of a loop



Control flow graphs (cont.)

- good questions to ask with a CFG
 - What is the win condition?
 - What branches take me to the win condition?
 - What code is unused?



Tips and tricks

- look up magic numbers
 - ex: [0x9e3779b9](#), golden ratio used in TEA (this came up in CSAW!)
- verify assumptions
 - can you run your own code in the VM?
 - ex: "I think opcode 0x9 performs an add". But does it?
- **brute force**
 - if the flag is checked one byte at a time, try every byte value



Brute force example

```
...
input = get_input();
const_array = [...];
for (int i = 0; i < input_len; i++) {
    if (input[i] != sum(const_array[0:i]) {
        print("Wrong!");
        break;
    }
}
...
```

- brute forcible, as the correct value of the i th character **only depends on the previous characters**
- try every character until we get one more loop iteration further



GDB Python template

```
import gdb
from struct import pack
import string
import sys
```

```
gdb.execute('file ./chal')
gdb.execute('b *(0x55555555539f)')
gdb.execute('set confirm off')
```

```
def count_correct(data):
    num_correct = int(gdb.parse_and_eval('$rax'))
    return len(data)
```

Use register/memory operands to see how much of input was correct

Set a breakpoint where it compares our input



Try every character until we find one that works!



```
flag = ''
best = len(flag)
alphabet = '_{}!' + string.ascii_lowercase +
string.digits + string.ascii_uppercase +
string.punctuation
for i in range(20):
    for c in alphabet:
        s = flag + c
        gdb.execute(f"run <<< '{s}'")
        count = count_correct()
        if count > best:
            best = count
            flag = s
            print(flag)
            break
```

```
gdb.execute('q')
```



Challenges

- ctf.sigpwny.com/challenges
 - VMWhere 0-2
 - Walkthrough of VMWhere 0 at the end of the meeting



Instrumentation

Computer go brrr



Background

- Two ways to find out what it does
 - Static analysis: looking at the binary without running it
 - **Dynamic analysis**: collecting information while running it
- Some common dynamic analysis tools:
 - gdb: classic debugger
 - **Pin: instrumentation tool**
 - angr: symbolic analysis



Motivation

- What if you wanted to:
 - Print the arguments to every strcmp call?
 - Count the number of function calls/code lines/instructions?
 - Log every memory write?




What is it

- Modifying binaries on-the-fly
- Add our own code ("instruments")
- Control flow recovery
- Added code does not affect the binary



Basic overview

1. Load the binary
2. Disassemble, recover basic blocks
3. Add instrumentation
4. Add to cache
5. Run the binary
 - a. Lazy; instrument more block only if necessary



How it works

- Disassemble the binary (recursive, linear)
 - Surprisingly non-trivial, esp. w/ variable-length instruction ISAs
- Analyze the disassembly and get "basic blocks"
 - Boundary at jumps/calls/rets
- Each basic block is individually analyzed

```
w = 0;
x = x + y;
y = 0;
if( x > z)
{
    y = x;
    x++;
}
else
{
    y = z;
    z++;
}
w = x + z;
```

Source Code

```
w = 0;
x = x + y;
y = 0;
if( x > z)
```

```
y = x;
x++;
```

```
y = z;
z++;
```

```
w = x + z;
```

Basic Blocks

B1

```
w = 0;
x = x + y;
y = 0;
if( x > z)
```

B2

```
y = x;
x++;
```


B3

```
y = z;
z++;
```

B4

```
w = x + z;
```

Basic Blocks



Flow Graph

Use Cases

- Instruction counting
- Function call statistics
- VM instruction tracing
- Memory watching
- Syscall tracing



Tool

- **Intel's PIN**
 - Fast, but steep learning curve
- **GDB Python**
 - Slow, but easy to use
- **DynamoRIO**
 - Open source



Real World Example

- "ropfuscated" from UIUCTF 2021
- VM reversing chal using ROP gadgets as the instructions
- difficult due to large VM program
- solve process:
 - use Pintool to dump instructions
 - analyze CFG
 - realized instructions follow a pattern (compiled from ELVM)
 - decompile to ELVM
 - step through program to find flag comparison checks



Dump executed instructions

```
004013c1 00414078      0x4013c1      0x800 0x414078 pop rsi ; ret
00401352 00414088      0x401352      0x414088 xchg rax, rsi ; ret
00401355 00414090      0x401355      0x414090 mov rcx, rax ; ret
0040133d 00414098      0x40133d      0x414098 xchg rcx, rbx ; ret
00401350 004140a0      0x401350      0x4040b4 0x4140a0 pop rax ; ret
0040136d 004140b0      0x40136d      0x4140b0 mov qword ptr [rax], rbx ; ret
00401350 004140b8      0x401350      0x44 0x4140b8 pop rax ; ret
00401337 004140c8      0x401337      0x4140c8 xchg rax, rbx ; ret
0040133d 004140d0      0x40133d      0x4140d0 xchg rcx, rbx ; ret
00401350 004140d8      0x401350      0x404094 0x4140d8 pop rax ; ret
00401369 004140e8      0x401369      0x4140e8 mov qword ptr [rax], rcx ; ret
00401350 004140f0      0x401350      0x0 0x4140f0 pop rax ; ret
004013b7 00414100      0x4013b7      0x40408c 0x414100 pop rbx ; ret
00401371 00414110      0x401371      0x414110 mov qword ptr [rbx], rax ; ret
004013b7 00414118      0x4013b7      0x40408c 0x414118 pop rbx ; ret
0040135d 00414128      0x40135d      0x414128 mov rax, qword ptr [rbx] ; ret
```




Decompile to ELVM

mov SP, imm 0x800	0x414078 ... 0x4140b0 (6)
mov B, imm 0x44	0x4140b8 ... 0x4140e8 (5)
mov F, imm 0x0	0x4140f0 ... 0x414110 (3)
mov A, F	0x414118 ... 0x414140 (4)
add A, A	0x414148 ... 0x4141a0 (9)
add A, A	0x4141a8 ... 0x414200 (9)
add A, A	0x414208 ... 0x414260 (9)
mov E, imm 0x4040c4	0x414268 ... 0x414290 (4)
add A, E	0x414298 ... 0x4142f0 (9)






Control flow graphs

Original ROP chain CFG



Decompile ELVM CFG



Big idea: finding patterns

- no one will hand write 4 MB of assembly
- find patterns to work your way up the "abstraction chain"
- in this challenge, the abstraction chain was:
 - C code
 - LLVM IR
 - ROP chain
 - ROP (in x86 assembly)
- each layer added 5-10x more instructions



Memoization

a.k.a dynamic programming



Fibonacci

```
def fib(n):  
    if n < 2: return n  
    return fib(n-1) + fib(n-2)
```

- What happens if we try to calculate `fib(100)`?
- Is there a way to optimize this?



Memoization

- Save function return values in a lookup table
- Only works if the function has no side effects
 - Same output for a given input



Real World Example

- "to_inefficient" from nitectf 2021
- two recursive calls
- calculates "n choose k" by the recurrence:

$$\binom{n}{k} = \binom{n-1}{k-1} + \binom{n-1}{k}$$

Recursive calls

```
1
2 long main.a(ulong **param_1,undefined8 param_2,undefi
3             ,undefined param_6,undefined8 param_7,unc
4
5 {
6     long in_RAX;
7     long lVar1;
8     long lVar2;
9     char cVar3;
10    undefined extraout_DL;
11    undefined extraout_DL_00;
12    long unaff_RBX;
13    long unaff_R14;
14    undefined8 in_stack_ffffffffffffffff8;
15    undefined8 in_stack_ffffffffffffffff0;
16
17    while (&stack0x00000000 < *(undefined **)(ulong *)
18           &stack0x00000000 == *(undefined **)(ulong *)
19           runtime.morestack_noctxt.abi0(param_1,param_2);
20           param_3 = extraout_DL_00;
21    }
22    if (unaff_RBX <= in_RAX) {
23        if ((unaff_RBX != 0) && (unaff_RBX != in_RAX)) {
24            cVar3 = (char)unaff_RBX + -1;
25            lVar1 = main.a(param_1,param_2,param_3,cVar3,
26                          in_stack_ffffffffffffffff0);
27            lVar2 = main.a(param_1,param_2,extraout_DL,cVa
28                          in_stack_ffffffffffffffff0);
29            return lVar2 + lVar1;
30        }
31        return 1;
32    }
33    return 0;
34 }
35
```


Solution: GDB Python

- Use GDB Python to cause function to immediately return with correct value
- I also patched original binary to replace entire function with a ret

```
# set silent breakpoint (see next slide)
...

lookup = []
# precomputed values for n choose k
with open('cycle', 'r') as f:
    for line in f:
        lookup += [int(line)]

for i in range(1000):
    # at the stopped breakpoint, do the lookup
    # and skip running the function
    rax = int(gdb.parse_and_eval('$rax'))
    cur = lookup[rax]
    gdb.execute('set $rax={}'.format(cur))
    gdb.execute('c')
```

Full script

```
import gdb
import math

gdb.execute('file ./chal_mod')
gdb.execute('set args flag.fig out4')
gdb.execute('set confirm off')
```

```
class MyBreakpoint(gdb.Breakpoint):
    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__('*0x4815f6')
        self.silent = True

    def stop(self):
        return True
```

```
MyBreakpoint()
```

Break at the
function



```
gdb.execute('run')
```

```
lookup = []
with open('cycle', 'r') as f:
    for line in f:
        lookup += [int(line)]
```

```
for i in range(1000):
    rax = int(gdb.parse_and_eval('$rax'))
    cur = lookup[rax]
    gdb.execute('set $rax={}'.format(cur))
    gdb.execute('c')
```

Replace the return
value



Challenges

- VMWhere 0-2: VM reversing
- Hell: VM reversing, instrumentation (very hard)
- Ropfuscated: briefly went over solve
 - Download here: <https://2021.uiuc.tf/challenges#ropfuscated-49>



Next Meetings

2023-02-26 - This Sunday

- Nintendo DSi Browser Exploit
- Nathan will share how he hacked the DSi web browser

2023-03-02 - Next Thursday

- Quantum computation with George



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VMWhere 0 demo